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THE VOLUNTARY CLOSING OF A
PRIVATE COLLEGE: A DECISION FOR
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES?
HARRIET

M.

KING*

[I]t is inappropriateto treat survival and growth as unquali-

fied good in themselves. Rather, I believe higher education's
leaders should continue to bear in mind that the only reason
for the existence of our institutions is to meet the significant

and demonstrable educational and related service needs of
the public.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In February 1979, the trustees of Wilson College, a small,
church-related liberal arts college for women in Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania, announced that the college would close at the end
of the spring 1979 session.2 On May 25, 1979, the closing was

enjoined. The injunction raised in stark relief the legal dilemma
facing trustees of a dying private college: May they permit the

college to die with dignity or must they keep it alive until every
last penny is expended and the college slowly has dissipated into

nothing?3 In analyzing this question, it is important to remem* Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A., Agnes Scott
College, 1964; LL.B., Vanderbilt, 1967; LL.M., Harvard, 1973. Member, Board of Trustees, Agnes Scott College.
1. Art, Questioning the Unquestionable: Should All Colleges Survive?, CHRONICLE
HIGHER EDUC., March 24, 1980, at 64.
2. Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. 27, 29 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1979).
3. During the 1960s, 77 colleges closed; another 144 closed in the 1970s. CHRONICLE
HIGHER Enuc., June 9, 1980, at 1. Many anticipate that private colleges increasingly will
become financially unable to continue. "The decline in the number of college-age Americans may force as many as 200 small, private, liberal-arts institutions to close their doors
in the 1980's." Id. See generally, e.g., Willmer & O'Connor, Closing with Compassion,
AM. A. GOVERNING BoARDs RxEs. 27 (November 1979). The trend towards more closings
is exemplified by the reported decision to close Annhurst College in Woodstock, Connecticut, at the end of the Spring 1980 semester, see CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., March 3,
1980, at 3, and a suit by a New York bank to foreclose a $40 million mortgage after the
mortgagor, a church-related university, missed six scheduled payments. See CHRONICLE
HIGHER EDUC., March 10, 1980, at 2. In addition, Fort Wright College in Spokane, Wash-
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ber that the interests of a number of different constituencies in
the college community, which may or may not have a legally
cognizable interest in the college, substantially affect the decision of the trustees.4
The Board of Trustees of Wilson College announced its decision to close the school in a resolution that had been reviewed
by counsel for the college. 5 They based their decision on awareness of "'the deteriorating situation with regard to admissions,
retention and enrollment as well as voluntary gifts and grants
and of the jeopardy in which the continuation of the College as
an excellent and effective college for women is placed

.

,"8

Prior to passage of the resolution
[t]he President was advised [by counsel for the college that] a
cy pres proceeding would be required before the actual closing
of the College, and she understood it would be necessary to
proceed with cy pres to use the assets of the College for something else. She was not advised by counsel that only the Court
7
had authority to decide whether the College would be closed.
On March 27, 1979, students, faculty members, and one trustee
filed a petition in state court naming the individual trustees of
the college as respondents. The petition asked (1) that the trustees show cause why they should not be removed as trustees of
the college, (2) that the court appoint successor trustees who
would be subject to the supervisory power of the court, and (3)
that the trustees be permanently enjoined from closing the
college. 8
ington, reportedly is discontinuing most of its four-year degree programs because of a
lack of funds. See CHRONICLE HIGHER EDuc., April 14, 1980, at 2.
4. The basic constituency groups of a college are the students, faculty, staff, alumni,
donors, and the public. Each of these groups has a particular reason for wanting the
college to remain open and to continue functioning. They may, however, face problems
in asserting standing to raise the legal issues. See notes 61-100 and accompanying text

infra.
5. Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. 27, 69 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1979).
6. Id. at 70 (quoting the resolution of the Board of Trustees of Wilson College as

adopted on February 17, 1979). One member of the Board was not present at the meeting when the resolution was adopted. Id. at 30.
7. Id. at 69-70. For a discussion of the cy pres doctrine, see notes 13-60 and accompanying text infra.

8. Id. at 28. In addition, the petitioners sought an injunction pendente lite
against
further implementation of the closing of the college, as well as an award of counsel fees
and costs. The court declined to grant the injunction. Id. at 28-29.
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Upon finding that the board had exceeded its authority by
announcing and implementing its decision to close the college
before obtaining court approval, the court issued an injunction
permanently enjoining the closing of the college. In addition, the
court removed the president of the college from the board of
trustees for gross abuse of discretion, removed another member
of the board for a conflict of interest, and ordered that the
properly served trustee-defendants personally bear the costs of
their defense.9
The announcement of the court's decision exploded like the
proverbial bombshell in the world of academic trustees. 10 Not
only had their worst fears of being second-guessed by the courts
come true, but the trustees were required to pay personally for
the privilege of being second-guessed. 1
II.

APPROVAL OF BOARD ACTION-WHEN TO INVOKE CY PRES?

A.

The Nature of the Problem

The basic issues that must be addressed by trustees 12 contemplating the closing of a college are easy to describe. A rational prediction of how a court will review the trustees' treatment of them is more difficult. It is the purpose of this Article to

analyze the questions and suggest bases for resolution.
The broad question is whether trustees alone may close the
college, or whether they must obtain permission from the court
through a cy pres proceeding. The answer to this question, in
turn, depends on whether or not the closing itself is a change in
fundamental purpose of the corporation resulting from financial
inability to perform the existing purpose. The factual question
9. Id. at 82-86.
10. For example, a general meeting for its membership was sponsored by the American Association of Governing Boards in late 1979 to explore the legal issues surrounding
the closing of a college.
11. Attorney's fees and costs have been exacted from unsuccessful challengers of a
school closing in the past. In Kolin v. Leitch, 343 Il. App. 622, 99 N.E.2d 685 (1951),
parents of students brought an action to enjoin a school closing. The action was dismissed on appeal for lack of standing. The trial court had issued a temporary injunction
restraining the school from closing. Under Illinois law the school subsequently recovered
damages incurred as a result of the injunction and recovered attorneys' fees and court
costs from the plaintiffs. Kolin v. Leitch, 351 IlM. App. 66, 113 N.E.2d 806 (1953).
12. Trustees, as discussed in this Article, include members of the board of trustees
or board of directors of a non-member, not-for-profit, charitable corporation.
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faced by the trustees is twofold. First, is it financially practicable for the college to continue as it is now constituted? Second,
if continuation is financially impracticable, will closing the college constitute a fundamental change in the purpose of the corporation, or can the fundamental purpose continue to be
achieved by a different means?
The difficulty is that as prerequisites to application of cy
pres, the court must also, first, conclude that financial impracticability does exist and, second, determine the fundamental purpose of the corporation. Thus, although determinations of fact
must be made by the trustees, independent determination of the
same facts are made by the court. With two original fact finders,
each acting properly, inconsistent conclusions can be reached.
The core of the problem, then, is to give legitimate scope to the
role of both decisionmakers.
B.

The Cy Pres Doctrine

Cy pres is an equitable doctrine that is invoked to allow the
assets of a charity to be used for a purpose other than that specifically required by the trust instrument or articles of incorporation. 13 The doctrine is invoked when the original purpose can
no longer be carried out because it is financially or otherwise
impracticable or impossible, or because it is illegal and when, at
the time of the gift to the charity, the donor had a general charitable intent that will encompass an alternative use of the dedicated assets.1 4 The purpose of the proceeding is to find the charitable use that most nearly approximates the original purpose of
the donor. The change that the court is allowing is a change in
the purpose to be served by the charity.
The equitable doctrine of deviation is used when the donor
has directed a particular manner of providing for the purpose of
the charity or a particular method of administering the charity
that is no longer possible.15 The relief granted in deviation is
relief from the direct method of performing the charitable act.
The purpose of the charity is not changed but instead is preserved by changing the manner of accomplishing it.

13. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
14. Id.
15. Id. at § 381.

OF TRUSTS

§ 399 (1957).
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Cy pres is appropriate if the financial impracticability of
continuing the operation of a college requires a change of purpose; deviation is proper if there is to be only a change in the
directed method of achieving the purpose. Because deviation is
not likely to be appropriate in the situation of closing a college,
it will not be discussed further. It may be useful to bear in mind,
however, that the same considerations would be applicable in a
deviation proceeding as are applicable to the cy pres proceeding.
Because court approval of a proposed course of action by the
trustees is necessary only when there is a change in purpose that
results from financial impracticability, 8 some guidance about
the courts' analyses of these issues is in order.
1. Financial Impracticability.-Casesthat deal with the
financial exigency required to terminate the contract of a tenured professor may give some guidance to understanding the
meaning of financial impracticability. In those cases the basic
issue has been whether the exigency is real or whether it is simply a disguise for firing a professor without proper cause.17
Although courts have consistently said that they will not
second-guess a board's conclusion that a financial exigency exists, "' they have, in fact, reviewed trustees' decisions. A wellpublicized example of one court's review is that of the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, which allowed a finding of financial exigency to stand, even though the dismissed
professor could have been paid had the board chosen to liquidate assets rather than hold them for continued appreciation. 19

16. That is, when the doctrine of cy pres must be applied in order to change the
purpose of the charity. See generally id. at § 399.
17. See Note, FinancialExigency as Cause for Termination of Tenured Faculty
Members in Private Post Secondary Educational Institutions, 62 IOWA L. REv. 481

(1976); Note, The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Reasons of FinancialExigency, 51
IND. L.J. 417 (1976).
18. In an unpublished opinion, the intermediate appellate court of Iowa reasoned

that

[t]he question whether a financial exigency existed is primarily a matter of
subjective judgment to be exercised by the university officials charged with the
responsibility of operating the university. We do not believe it is a question of
fact to be determined by a jury. Moreover, we do not believe it is a matter for
the substitution of the court's judgment or the juror's judgment for that of the
administrative body. ...
Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, 255 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977), quoted in H.
EDWARDS & V. NORTON, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 269 (1978).
19. AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 446, 346 A.2d 615, 617 (Super.
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At trial, existence of the assets had been held to be evidence
that there was in fact no financial exigency. 20 The Fourth Circuit
has found that financial exigency "should be determined by the
adequacy of a college's operating funds rather than its capital
assets. '21 Nevertheless, continuing deficits together with declin-

ing enrollments in a school that is predominantly tuition-based
may not be sufficient to justify a decision to close and terminate
the contracts of tenured professors in the face of failure to explore alternatives such as reduction of salaries and increases in
tuition.22
When there is evidence that a financial exigency exists,
courts have required that a decision not to retain tenured
professors be made in a good faith attempt to avert the financial
difficulty.2 3 Good faith may be evidenced if no one is hired for

several years to teach in the vacated position. When the college
has hired younger and presumably lower-salaried faculty members to cover the same duties as the dismissed professor, the hirings are considered to be evidence that the process is nothing
more than a way to dismiss the tenured professor without cause

and in bad faith.
The validity of this inference may be subject to challenge,
however. There is some notion of critical mass involved in pro-

Ct. App. Div. 1975).
20. AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 261, 322 A.2d 846, 857 (Super
Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
21. Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 681 (4th Cir. 1978). ("As a result of
the large annual deficits aggregating more than $1,500,000 over an extended period and
the steady decline in enrollment, the college's financial position was precarious ... the
trustees reasonably believed that the college was faced with financial exigency.").
22. See generally Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. 27 (Pa. Orphans'
Ct. 1979). This case, of course, looks at the decision to close the college, including the
termination of the contracts of tenured faculty members, not just at the release of a
portion of the faculty.

23. See Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 681 (4th Cir. 1978); AAUP v.
Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 447, 346 A.2d 615, 617 (Super. Ct. App. Div.

1975). See generally Tucker, FinancialExigency-Rights, Responsibilities, and Recent
Decisions, 2 J.C. & U.L. 103 (1974).
24. See AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 257, 322 A.2d 846, 856
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975). In Note, The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Reasons of FinancialExigency,
supra note 17, the suggestion is made that when enrollment is declining and the situation is unstable, there is an exigency that justifies terminating contracts of tenured
faculty members, but that when the situation is stable, termination of those contracts
should be permitted only as a last resort.
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viding a curricular offering of sufficient depth to attract students
to an area of study.15 An academic program in a single discipline, political science, for example, requires more than one professor to exist. Suppose that the critical mass in political science
is three professors. Further, suppose that the college has two
tenured political science professors, each costing the college
$30,000 per year, and that the college can hire a new professor
for $15,000 a year. If the college dismisses one of the tenured
professors and hires two new professors, the critical mass is obtained and the enterprise continues. If the college retains the
two tenured professors, the department is below the critical
mass, things go from bad to worse as enrollment drops, and
eventually both tenured professors will lose their jobs because of
financial exigency. While this example is overly simplistic, it illustrates a dilemma that college trustees face when deciding
among alternatives to reducing the staff28 and the effects on the
institution that will result if such alternatives are pursued.27
It is, in short, a no-win situation. Therefore, it is important
for courts to be extremely cautious and to insure that they do
not simply substitute their judgment of financial impracticability for that of the trustees. The legitimate public interest in requiring accountability is protected when the trustees are required to make their decisions with due care and in good faith.28
This standard of review is particularly necessary when the
courts have provided no meaningful guidelines for the trustees
to use when making their decision. The financial exigency cases
illustrate that assets, cash flow, and long-term economic projections are factors that the court will consider. They do not tell us
how they will affect the court's decision nor how they should be
viewed by the trustees.
2. Purpose.-Once financial impracticability is found, the

25. The court in Zehner v. Alexander impliedly recognized this notion when it said
that an adequate student body is necessary to provide funding for a "competent faculty
of adequate size to provide adequate coverage of fields." Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin
County Legal J. 27, 37 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1979).

26. Alternatives include abolition of tenure and reduction of salaries.
27. A less drastic alternative than abolishing tenure would be to put a freeze on the
granting of tenure when the board believes financial difficulty lies ahead. Either step,
however, likely will be viewed by the academic community as a significant drawback to
affiliation with the college. Even with changes in the tenure system, a cut in operating
costs will not result unless salaries are lowered or the number of employees is reduced.

28. See notes 109-114 and accompanying text infra.
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need for a cy pres action further depends upon a determination
of the purpose of the charity. When the property is impressed
with an express trust, the express purpose of the donor is at issue. In the case of a preexisting charitable corporation, however,
such as a college, it must be presumed that, when a donor makes
an unrestricted gift to the corporation, it is to be used for the
stated purpose of the corporation. Thus, in the latter case, the
fundamental purpose of the corporation is at issue. The starting
point for the determination of the fundamental purpose of the
corporation is the statement of purpose in the articles of incorporation.29 In addition, some courts have looked to the activities
in which the corporation was actually engaged at the time of the
30

gift.

In Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger,3 1 the hospital
board decided to close the hospital operated by the corporation
and to use the remaining assets for the purpose of operating outpatient clinics. Since the corporation had previously operated
outpatient clinics, there was no question concerning corporate
authority to operate clinics in addition to the hospital. The California Attorney General objected to the proposed closing on the
grounds that it would "constitute an abandonment of Queen's
primary charitable purpose and a diversion of charitable trust
assets. '32 The court held that the primary purpose of the corpo-

ration was defined in the articles of incorporation and in the
wanner in which the charity conducted its activities at the time
of the gifts. 33 Applying this two-factor test, the court concluded
that
[t]he question is not whether Queen can use some of its assets
or the proceeds from the operation of the hospital for purposes
other than running a hospital; it certainly can and has. The
question is whether it can cease to perform the primary purpose for which it was organized. That we believe it cannot do. 4

29. Obviously, with regard to specific property, one must also consult any document
of transfer or other agreement with the donor to ascertain whether or not there is an
express trust.
30. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36
(1977).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 365, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 368, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
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The result of this conclusion was to activate the provisions of
the articles of incorporation relating to the distribution of assets
upon dissolution. Because the charter provided for that distribution, the court did not need to approve any proposed alternative
35

use.

Frequently the articles of incorporation will list a number of

purposes. When dissolution is contemplated, the court must
choose the purposes that will continue to be fulfilled. When possible, courts prefer to continue to fill substantially all of the
stated purposes rather than a single purpose, even when the
members of the charity have indicated that they would prefer
the single purpose. An example of this principle is found in MetropolitanBaptist Church v. Younger. 6 In this case, the purpose
expressed in the articles of incorporation was to establish a fundamentalist Baptist church in Richmond, California, and to
preach and teach the scriptures. Upon dissolution of the corporation, the members wished to make distributions to several
charitable organizations. The court rejected the plan because the
proposed distribution would not be in accord with the purposes
expressed in the articles. The court decided that only a local
church would meet the charter requirements of geography and
religious mission and directed that all of the assets be so
distributed. 7
The consent of the attorney general to a proposed change
on the ground that the change is in the public interest does not
preclude the court from finding that the change is impermissible. In Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Sur-

35. ABA-ALI MODEL NON-PROFIT CoRP. ACT §§ 45-62 set out a proposed statutory
scheme for dissolution of a corporation. Section 46 provides:
(c) Assets received and held by the corporation subject to limitations permitting their use only for charitable, religious, eleemosynary, benevolent, educational or similar purposes, but not held upon a condition requiring return,
transfer or conveyance by reason of the dissolution, shall be transferred or conveyed to one or more domestic or foreign corporations, societies or organizations engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation, pursuant to a plan of distribution adopted as provided in this Act;
(d) Other assets, if any, shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of the articles of incorporation or the by-laws to the extent that the articles of incorporation or by-laws determine the distributive rights of members,
or any class or classes of members, or provide for distribution to others ....
Id. at § 46.
36. 48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1975).
37. Id.
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geons, 8 the majority of the trustees of an osteopathic college of
medicine determined to change the accreditation to allopathic
medicine. The California Attorney General had consented to the
change on the ground that it would not be detrimental to the
public interest. After determining that the minority trustees had
standing to raise the question of whether or not the change
would constitute a diversion of the funds from the primary purpose of the donors, the court held that having the osteopathic
curriculum and promoting osteopathy, not merely operating a
medical school, were the primary purposes of the donors.3 9 The
court thus implied that if the college of osteopathy could not be
continued for some reason, then other methods of promoting osteopathy would be preferred to permitting the assets to be used
to develop allopathic medicine in an ongoing medical college.
The articles were the primary source of the court's independent
determination of the fundamental purpose.4 °
Courts have found some proposed changes to be permissible, including the addition of a liberal arts college to a university
already chartered to conduct programs in law, medicine, and
theology; 41 the merger of a college into another university although the college relinquished its name, which was that of its
principal donor; 42 and reorganization of a private college into a
public one.43 In the last of these cases, the court said:
The basic functions, purpose and role of the University as an
educational institution remains [sic] unchanged. The mode or
technique of internal management is changed. I find that the
modifications are fair and reasonable and consistent with the
purposes set forth in the charter and its subsequent
44
amendments.
In Trustees of Rush Medical College v. University of Chi-

38. 61 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964).

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. State v. U.S. Grant Univ., 115 Tenn. 238, 90 S.W. 294 (1905).
42. Lupton v. Leander Clark College, 194 Iowa 1008, 187 N.W. 496 (1922) (the dom-

inant purpose of the donor was to provide education, not to perpetuate his name).
43. Trustees of Rutgers College of Richman, 41 N.J. Super. 259, 125 A.2d 10 (1956)

(The donor's purpose was not to continue the management of the college without
change). But see Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819), in which a change in management was found to violate the charter of the college.
44. Trustees of Rutgers College of Richman, 41 N.J. Super. at 292, 125 A.2d at 28.
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cago,45 a medical college wished to transfer its assets to the University of Chicago to improve the financial viability of the college. The attorney general objected to the proposed transfer on
the ground that "a charitable corporation created by law for a
definite purpose, cannot donate or transfer its funds to another
corporation organized for similar purposes."4 After finding the
purpose of Rush Medical College to be the provision of medical
education, the Illinois court permitted the transfer because "the
cause of medical education will be better served by transferring
the college to the university as a going concern than to wait until
there is a total collapse and then transfer the wreck to the university. . . .,4 It follows that had the court concluded that the
primary purpose of Rush Medical College corporation was to operate an ongoing educational institution rather than to provide
education, it would not have approved the transfer.
In Fenn College v. Nance,48 a case factually similar to the
Wilson College case, the trustees of Fenn College proposed to
liquidate the assets of the college and use the resulting funds to
establish a foundation "with the purpose of wide support of

educational, literary, charitable and scientific activities and
projects. 4 9 The Ohio Court of Common Pleas approved the dissolution. The assets were being transferred to Cleveland State
University, a competing school believed to be the more viable
institution. Fenn would receive money in exchange for its plant
and other assets. The court noted that an Ohio corporation has,
by statute, the right to transfer assets.5 0 In addition, the Ohio
Code specifically authorizes modification of corporate names5"
and purpose.52 Given this authority, the court concluded:
In the instant case, it is clear that the doctrine of deviation
should be applied (1) to declare that in view of altered circumstances Fenn [the closing college] is fully justified in changing
the form of its corporate existence while still carrying on the
broad educational purposes of its charter; and (2) to make it

45. 312 IMI.109, 143 N.E. 434 (1924).
46. Id. at. 113, 143 N.E. at 436.

47. Id.
48. 4 Ohio Misc. 183, 210 N.E.2d 418 (1965).
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 185, 210 N.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 188, 210 N.E.2d at 422.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1702.38 (Page 1978).
Id. at § 1713.25.
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clear that the transfer of assets and facilities to or for the use
by [the transferee] is a justified departure from the original object of generous gifts made in the past by so many, but not a
material change in the charitable uses intended by such donors, and that therefore no donor may complain or hereafter
have any cause of action against Fenn, its trustees or members
growing out of the execution or carrying out of the agreement
[to sell the assets].58
In the context of broad enabling legislation, the court in Fenn

College viewed the broad purposes of the charter as determinative and did not look to the actual activities carried out under
the charter as did the California court in Queen of Angels.5
It is important not to confuse the language of method with
the language of purpose when looking at a charter. Although
specific direction about method must be followed unless the
court determines in a deviation proceeding that it is inappropriate, the method is irrelevant to the finding of purpose. When the
charter provides no direction concerning the method of achieving the purpose, the trustees may exercise their discretion without obtaining court approval in advance, although the court may
review their action to prevent abuse of discretion. 55 As stated by
the Missouri court: "[C]hanges and differences in the modus
operandi-in technique-in the means of accomplishing the objects and purposes expressed in the articles of agreement-...
do not constitute a departure, deviation from or perversion of
the objects and purposes of [the charity] . .

.

56

In summary, three conslusions may be drawn from existing
case law. First, the purpose of a charitable corporation will be
determined primarily from the language in the articles of incorporation. 57 In some cases, however, the activities of the corporation at the time of the gifts may provide additional guidance. 58

53. 4 Ohio Misc. at 191-92, 210 N.E.2d at 423.
54. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
55. Ranken.Jordan Home v. Drury College, 449 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo. 1970) (citing
Taylor v. Baldwin, 362 Mo. 1224, 247 S.W.2d 741 (1952)).
56. Ranken-Jordan Home v. Drury College, 449 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo. 1970).
57. See notes 36-37, 40, 44-53 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra. The purpose also may be found
in the document conveying property to the charitable corporation just as it can be found
in documents of conveyance to a charitable trust. See, e.g., In re Los Angeles County
Pioneer Soc'y, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 257 P.2d 1 (1953).
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Second, if more than one purpose is stated in the articles, the
court will look for a way to perform as many as possible." Finally, it is doubtful that the concurrence of the attorney general
in the change of purpose will be persuasive to the court.60
III.

STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE

DECISION TO CLOSE

In the Wilson College case, the trustees apparently contemplated that a cy pres hearing would be required before assets
were put to a new use, but did not believe that a hearing would
be necessary before approval of the closing itself. 1 The petitioners, representing various interests in the school, then challenged
the legality of the actual decision to close. Their action raises a
question of standing that needs to be addressed by the courts.
Traditionally, the attorney general of the state has been
held to have exclusive standing to challenge the management decisions of a public charitable corporation.2 Arguably, this doctrine of exclusivity needs to be abandoned when the board of
trustees has decided to close a college. Students and employees
of the college have a present, definite interest in its continuation
which should be protected by access to the courts.
A.

The TraditionalDoctrine of Exclusivity

Historically, a trustee of a charitable trust was answerable
to the visitor appointed by the donor to assure that the purposes
of the trust were being carried out.63 Early in the history of the
United States, educational institutions frequently were organ59. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
60. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.

61. See Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. 27, 35, 69-70 (Pa. Orphans'
Ct. 1979).
62. See notes 73 & 74 and accompanying text infra.

63. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
To all eleemosynary corporations a visitorial power attaches, as a necessary incident;.., there shall somewhere exist a power to visit, inquire into,
and correct all irregularities and abuses in such corporations, and to compel
the original purposes of the charity to be faithfully fulfilled ....
[Tihe
founder and his heirs are the legal visitors, unless the founder has appointed
and assigned another person to be visitor ....
This visitatorial power ...
stands upon the maxim that he who gives his property has a right to regulate it
in the future.
Id. at 673-74 (Story, J., concurring). See, e.g., In re James Murdock, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.)
303, 324 (1828); In re Norton, 97 Misc. 289, 161 N.Y.S. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
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ized in corporate form, but assets received by the trustees were
restricted to specified purposes or the trustees were controlled
directly by the donors or religious groups."e These controls assured that funds were used as intended by the donor and there
was little room for the exercise of discretion, wisely or otherwise,
on the part of the trustees. 5 In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries these informal methods of control were quite
effective because donations were made primarily on an annual
basis rather than in the form of a permanent endowment.68
More recently, however, operating budgets have received substantial support from large endowment funds managed by the
board of trustees. 7 As a result, a need has arisen for new assurances that the trustees use the funds for the designated
purposes.
The present system does not have any natural check on the
decisions of the trustees." The trustees of a charitable corporation generally are a self-perpetuating group. Typically, there is
no membership to whom they are legally responsible, nor are
they the donors of most of the assets in their control. In addition, the visitation power, once an effective check on trustee
power, has fallen into relative disuse. 9
64. For an interesting, well-researched discussion of early financing of private higher
education, see Berry & Buchwald, Enforcement of College Trustees' Fiduciary Duties:
Students and the Problem of Standing, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 1-11 (1974).
In short, it appears that traditionally the financial resources of most colleges
were controlled only minimally by their trustees. Lands and liquid assets were
frequently managed by founders, donors, or alumni, while what money was
vested in the trustees rarely exceeded that needed for earmarked projects or
the annual operating expenses. In this context of no endowment for investment, subtle conflicts of interest by trustees amounting to serious breaches of
fiduciary duty, understandably, were very unusual.
Id. at 8. The authors note further that "the trustees served as little more than a titular
board presiding over the daily educational affairs of the college." Id. at 11.
65. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
66. See Berry & Buchwald, supra note 64, at 4.
67. For instance, Harvard University's endowment was valued at $1,457,690,000 on
June 30, 1979. CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., April 14, 1980, at 16.

68. See Berry & Buchwald, supra note 64, at 13.
University funding now vests in the trustees awesome financial power that may
be exercised in their sole discretion. The mere existence of such financial
power creates a much greater likelihood for trustee misconduct than was present under former extra-legal donor supervision.
Id.
69. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T.
458 (2d ed. rev. 1977).

BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs
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In the situation of the typical private trust, the named beneficiaries clearly have standing to ask a court to review the decisions of

the trustees regarding the management and disposition

of the funds in their control.70 In the for-profit corporate model,
the share-holders are the analogous group.71 In the charitable,
nonmember corporation, however, there is no strictly analogous
group because the beneficiary is "the public;"7 2 Although an individual may be the direct beneficiary of the particular service

The technical power of visitation in the founder of a charitable corporation would seem to exist in the United States, unless abolished by statute, but
to be of decreasing importance.
The exact status of the doctrine of visitation in modem American law is
not clear. It seems to be a relic of earlier times which has not been expressly
abolished by statutes in some states and has been occasionally recognized by
decision. It is not believed, however, that as a feature of charitable trust administration it is practical or desirable unless statutory supervision and enforcement is inadequate.
Id. See also State v. Taylor, 58 Wash. 2d 252, 362 P.2d 247 (1961). But see Trustees of
Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors of Theological Institution in Phillips Academy,
253 Mass. 256, 148 N.E. 900 (1925).
70. Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 479-80 (1901); Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co.,
234 N.Y. 394, 138 N.E. 33, 38 (1923); Shaffer v. Shaffer, 17 N.Y. Misc. 2d 592, 183
N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Ky. 1978).
71. The right is primarily that of bringing a stockholder's derivative action against
the corporate officers. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522
(1946).
The stockholder's derivative action ...is an invention of equity to supply
the want of an adequate remedy at law to redress breaches of fiduciary duty by
corporate managers. Usually the wrongdoing officers also possess the control
which enables them to suppress any effort by the corporate entity to remedy
such wrongs. Equity therefore traditionally entertains the derivative or secondary action by which a single stockholder may sue in the corporation's right
when he shows that the corporation, on proper demand, has refused to pursue
a remedy, or shows facts that demonstrate the futility of such a request.
Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally 13 R. ECKOPF & MEIER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5907-6045.5 (1980).
72. See Kolin v. Leitch, 343 IM.App. 622, 99 N.E.2d 685 (1951). (Plaintiffs, parents
and students of a school supported in part by funds from a charitable trust, were seeking
to question the trustees' decision to close the school. They joined the attorney general as
a party plaintiff who then took control of the suit and moved to dismiss. The court
granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs did not have beneficial status sufficient to
allow them to maintain the suit without the attorney general even though the students
were already enrolled in the school and enjoying the benefit of the trust. The court applied the rule that the purpose of the trust is to benefit the public and decided that these
plaintiffs had no particular identifiable interest.); Sister Elizabeth Kenny Foundation v.
National Foundation, 267 Minn. 352, 126 N.W.2d 640 (1964) (potential beneficiaries of
the assets of a changing charity do not have a beneficial interest sufficient to support a
suit).
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that a charitable corporation provides, the purpose of the charity, according to many courts, is to benefit the public at large by
providing direct benefit to individual members of the public.
The logical representative of the public is the state acting
through the attorney general.73 From this line of reasoning developed the principle that the attorney general has exclusive
standing to challenge decisions of the board of trustees of a
charitable corporation with respect to matters of management
and distribution of income.7 '
The rule of exclusive standing has not been adopted universally, however.7 5 For example, if the persons directly benefiting
are an ascertainable group, some courts have found the required
standing.
Notwithstanding that a trust may be charitable and may look
generally to the benefit of the public, yet if the terms defining
it are such that it is possible to ascertain definite persons and
institutions as the recipients of its benefits, such definitely ascertained persons have a status which entitles them to sue
without the intermediation of the attorney general ....

In

such cases the reason for the rule that the attorney general
must sue, viz., that there is no one among the indefinite public
who can assert himself to be peculiarly interested as distin73. This power is sometimes described as being the exercise of the right of parens
patriae rather than protection of the beneficial interest. See, e.g., Beatty v. Kurtz, 27
U.S. (2 Peters) 566 (1829); State v. Bibb, 234 Ala. 46, 173 So. 74 (1937); Sigmund Steinberger Foundation, Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
74. See Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52
MICH. L. Rav. 633, 633-34 (1954).
While the courts often talk of individuals who are to get charitable benefits as
"beneficiaries," strictly speaking the state is the only party having a legal interest in enforcement, and the human beings who are favorably affected by the
execution of the trust are merely the media through whom the social advantages flow to the public. If a trust has as its object the care of the poor,
those persons who are chosen to secure the necessities of life under it are not
in reality beneficiaries of the trust but only the instrumentalities through
which the state receives the social advantage of seeing that its citizens do not
suffer want. That this is true is shown by the rule that only the attorney general of the state can sue for enforcement, since he is the legal officer whose
duty it is to represent the interests of the state and its citizens.
Id. In some states the attorney general's role is codified. E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 9505,
10207 (West 1977); GA. CoDE ANN. § 108:212 (1979).
75. See Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977). In a suit concerning the
management of funds by the trustees, the court held students and faculty to be "beneficiaries with a sufficient special interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust [to] institute a suit as to that trust ... ." Id.
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guished from others, finds no justification in fact. The reason
failing, the rule should fail. In order for the attorney general to
be alone entitled to enforce a charitable trust there must be
"some benefit to be conferred upon, or duty to be performed
towards, either the public at large or some part thereof, or an
indefinite class of persons." 6
B. Refinement of the Doctrine
When it became apparent that most attorneys general

would not or could not supervise all charitable corporations consistently with the interests of particular individuals, the exclu-

sive standing doctrine was refined to permit the interested individual to bring suit in the name of the attorney general.7 If the
attorney general refused to consent to the suit for some reason,

however, the individual still was denied standing and, because
the consent of the attorney general to the prosecution of the suit
was viewed as a matter of discretion, his decision was not subject to judicial review.7
These rules on standing were designed to allow proper representation of the true beneficiaries while preventing numerous

76. Cannon v. Stephens, 18 Del. Ch. 276, 278, 159 A. 234, 236-37 (1932).
77. See Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Foundation, 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329 P.2d
118 (1958).
A relator is a party in interest who is permitted to institute a proceeding
in the name of the People or the attorney general when the right to sue resides
solely in that official .... The attorney general prescribes his own rules for
granting such consent and they may be entirely informal.
Id. at 538-39, 329 P.2d at 133.
78. Ames v. Attorney Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955).
In our opinion the decision of the Attorney General not to permit the use
of his name in a suit against the College for alleged breach of a public charitable trust was a purely executive decision which is not reviewable in a court of
justice. The duty of taking action to protect public charitable trusts and to
enforce proper application of their funds rests solely upon the Attorney General as the representative of the public interests.
Id. at 248, 124 N.E.2d at 513.
The situation may arise in which a state receives property from a private person in
trust for the people of the state. Because the property belongs to the state, the attorney
general is the representative of the state authority that manages the property and, therefore, cannot also represent the beneficiaries of the trust. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine has permitted individual citizens who alleged injury-in-fact to maintain the suit
under those circumstances. The decision was based on the ground that the attorney general could not represent both sides of the same case. It did not abandon the idea that the
standing of the attorney general is exclusive. Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Auth., 385
A.2d 189 (Me. 1978).
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nuisance suits by those who had a complaint against the charity.

The supporting policy was to preserve the assets of the charitable corporation by not wasting them in the defense of suits, frivolous or otherwise. 79 Even in states that have refined the exclu-

sive standing doctrine, there remains a need to allow access to
the courts for review of the decision of the trustees when the
attorney general has decided that an individual's proposed suit
is ill-advised,80 or when the attorney general has made an ad-

ministrative decision to stay out of court because of lack of
staff,"' or simply when he is unaware of the alleged
indiscretion. 2
California courts have recognized the need to promote actual accountability and have substantially eroded the doctrine of

exclusive standing. In PepperdineFoundation v. Pepperdine,3
a 1954 decision, the foundation sought to hold its principal donor and previous manager personally liable for losses resulting
from imprudent investments. The court declined to permit the
suit, stating:
If he as an individual could not be sued for negligently investing his own moneys intended for charitable uses, why should
79. See Koin v. Leitch, 343 Ill. App. 622, 99 N.E.2d 685 (1951); Longcor v. City of
Red Wing, 206 Minn. 627, 289 N.W. 570 (1940); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note
69, at § 414.
80. In Veteran's Indus., Inc. v. Lynch, 8 Cal. App. 3d 902, 88 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1970),
an organization was unable to challenge the attorney general's approval of an alternative
use of a dissolving charitable corporation. The organization asserted that it would more
nearly carry out the donor's purpose than would the proposed distributee.
81. See Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,73 HARV. L. Rav. 433, 451-56 (1960); Note, State Supervision of the Administration of Charitable Trusts, 47 COLUM. L. Rnv. 659, 662-64 (1947); Comment, Supervision of Charitable Trusts, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 118, 119 (1953).
Berry and Buchwald suggest that very little has changed in the offices of the attorneys general since Karst wrote.
Since the exclusive enforcement power is held by virtue of an assumed capacity
to supervise, the attorney general's inability to perform effective supervision
directly calls into question his continued claim to exclusive standing. Limited
resources, inadequate reporting requirements, and a great dependence on citizen complaints all constrict attorneys' general capacity to monitor trustee
decisions.
Berry & Buchwald, supra note 64, at 24-25.
82. See Berry & Buchwald, supra note 64, at 24-25. They argue that "the fact that
attorneys' general access to trustee decisions is severely limited, in itself refutes the concept that supervision can be more satisfactorily performed by one acting under official
responsibility than private interested groups." Id.
83. 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271 P.2d 600 (1954).
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his own "Foundation" under the management of strangers

prosecute an action to recover from the original donor and his
friends what through negligence, they lost for the
Foundation?8
The court then declared that only the attorney general had the
capacity to bring suit to protect the assets of a public charity. 85
Twenty years later in Holt,8 the same court declined to follow the exclusive standing rule when the attorney general would
not bring suit. The court began its analysis by asserting that the
doctrine of exclusive standing is not "the prevailing view in
other jurisdictions '87 and concluded "that a trustee or other person having a sufficient special interest may also bring an action
... -88 It recognized that "[i]n addition to the general public
interest [represented by the attorney general], . . there is the

interest of donors who have directed that their contributions be
used for certain charitable purposes." 89 It did not, however, explicitly hold that interest sufficient to create standing.90
Two years later, the California Court of Appeals elaborated
in a suit by a local Boy Scout council against a city that allegedly misused certain property that it held in trust for the benefit
of the scouts.
In view of the city's [trustee's] bald contention ... [that] it

has the right to apply the trust property, or the proceeds from
the sale of it, to a wider or broader public use than that provided for in the original trust instrument, the need of the boys
and girls who were the original beneficiaries of the trust for
representation is at least as great as that of the general public.
We think that need can best be met by representation by those
who are directly concerned with their interests and welfare.9 1

84. Id. at 160, 271 P.2d at 604.
85. Id. at 161, 271 P.2d at 605.
86. 61 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964).
87. Id. at 753, 394 P.2d at 934, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 754, 394 P.2d at 935, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
90. See id. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
91. San Diego County Council, BSA v. City of Escondido, 14 Cal. App. 3d 189, 196,
92 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 (1971). For an interesting overview of the development of California's system of regulating trusts and charities, see Howland, The History of the Supervision of Charitable Trusts and Corporations in California, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1029
(1966).
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The court concluded that the plaintiff organization represented
those with a direct interest in the trust and therefore had standing to sue. The court, however, did not decide whether individual scouts also had standing as beneficiaries. 2 The approach
taken in the later California cases is similar to the injury-in-fact
test used by the federal courts and is consistent with the traditionally liberal interpretations of standing in state courts.9e
C. Other Potential Plaintiffs
In addition to the group of beneficiaries that, under certain
circumstances, may assert a direct interest in the charity, a
group of donors also may assert an interest. The interest of a

donor is not generally recognized at law as being sufficient to
challenge decisions of the trustees unless there is an express
trust and a retained interest in the gift. Once the property is
vested fully in the trustee, the donor has no standing to enforce
92. 14 Cal. App. at 196-97, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
93. See generally Davis, The LiberalizedLaw of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 450
(1970). Not every state has followed California's example, however. In a suit involving
Rice University, decided at almost the same time as Holt, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals expressed the view that standing to initiate a suit is exclusive to the attorney
general.
Neither as alumni, nor as potential or past beneficiaries, have appellants
been given any peculiar or individual rights, distinct from those of the public
at large, in or to the trust property by the Indenture, nor have they been
charged with any duty relating to the trust by that instrument. By the terms of
the Indenture, the number of potential beneficiaries is large and indeterminate. We see no reason why the fact that in the past appellants may have
received special benefits from the trust gives them a justifiable interest in the
subject matter of this suit....
A more difficult question arises on consideration of the allegation that appellants are donors and contributors to the endowment fund. However, the
great weight of authority supports the rule that neither the donors of a fund
devoted exclusively to charitable purposes, nor contributors to such fund, have
such an interest in the fund as to entitle them to maintain suit to interfere
with, or direct, the management of the fund by the trustees.
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 387 S.W.2d 132, 136-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (citations omitted). This was supported on appeal by the Supreme Court of Texas.
The policy behind the refusal to let others bring suit is to protect the trust and
the trustees from harassment. Intervenors agree that they could not have instituted the suit. But the suit was instituted by Rice against the Attorney General, thus properly invoking the equity powers of the court.
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 403 S.W.2d 340, 347 (Tex. 1966). The court, however, reversed the lower court's finding that the intervenors did not have standing to
appeal once the equity powers were properly invoked, noting that their standing was not
challenged below. Id. at 348.
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the prescribed use.94 Although many donors, in fact, may have
substantial influence over the management and disposition of
funds during their lives, the mere fact of having given money to
the institution does not, under existing law, automatically provide standing to mount a legal challenge to the management and
disposition of income by the board of trustees. 5
An additional interested group is the co-trustees. These persons generally do have standing to challenge the decisions of
their colleagues in order to protect themselves from liability for
improper decisions.96 In addition, trustees generally can seek removal of one another on grounds such as conflict of interest or
9
abuse of discretion.

7

D.

Conclusion

Under present rules of standing in most state courts, access
to challenge a decision by trustees to close a college is too limited. Given the disadvantages of vesting exclusive standing in
the state's attorney general,9 it is necessary to develop new
rules of standing that will allow broader access to the courts. A
framework for a new test already exists in the federal courts,
which have moved from the old test of a legal interest toward
one of injury-in-fact. 9 The rationale of the injury-in-fact test is
94. O'Hara v. Grand Lodge, I.O.G.T., 213 Cal. 131, 139-40, 2 P.2d 21, 24 (1931). Nor

will standing be conferred on a donor who makes the attorney general a party to the
proceeding. Id.
95. See Matin Hosp. Dist. v. State Dept. of Health, 92 Cal. App. 3d 442, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 838 (1979).

The standing problem is different when the issues involved are not related to management and use of funds. For example, a student may have standing to assert an action
based on breach of a contract for education between the school and student or an action
claiming discriminatory expulsion. See Williams v. Howard University, 528 F.2d 658,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 41 Ill. App. 3d
804, 354 N.E.2d 586 (1976). A faculty member may sue for violations of his constitutional
rights. See Shaw v. Board of Trustees of Frederick Community College, 549 F.2d 929
(4th Cir. 1976).
96. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 752-53,
394 P.2d 932, 934, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246-47 (1964). Such an action would seek declaratory relief.
97. In re Rentschler Estate, 392 Pa. 46, 139 A.2d 910, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826
(1958); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 69, at § 522.
98. See notes 80-82 supra.
99. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970). See generally Davis, supra note 40.
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that someone who will be directly injured by the proposed action
should be able to represent fully the interest of the affected public, particularly if it is unlikely that the question will be raised
otherwise. Applying this approach to a charitable corporation,
currently enrolled students, faculty, or staff would meet the requirement of injury-in-fact when there is a proposal to close a
college and would have standing to challenge the decision. 100 A
contributor or alumnus probably would not meet the test because his present interest would not be affected by the closing.
IV. REVIEWING THE DECISION TO CLOSE-WHAT STANDARD TO
APPLY?

Once there is an appropriate person or group to bring the
action, the next question arises of what standard the court
should use to judge the conclusions of the trustees that the col-

lege is financially incapable of continuing and that the fundamental purpose of the corporation may better be served by closing the college and applying the assets elsewhere.
It is useful to consider the standard applied to directors or
trustees in related situations. The duty of care imposed on corporate directors in a for-profit setting is to act with ordinary

care and in good faith.101 A corporate director will be held to the
standard of the "ordinarily prudent man. 1 0 2 In a for-profit cor-

porate model, this duty can be discharged by delegation, although the director retains an obligation of general oversight or
supervision and, consequently, must make reasonable efforts to
keep informed about the propriety of activities carried on by the
delegate.10 3 A corporate director, while fully honoring the obligaNote that the federal courts have the Article III "case or controversy" requirement
which has dictated much of the development of the federal law of standing. Because the
states are under no similar constitutional requirement they are free to develop standing
differently.
100. See, e.g., Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (faculty and students were found to have standing).
101. See KNEPPER, LiABErrY oF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.05 at 11 (3d
ed. 1978) ("officials owe three basic duties to the corporations they serve: obedience,
diligence and loyalty").
102. See id. ("'diligence' has been said to contemplate that a director will exercise
that degree of care which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under the same or similar circumstances in the conduct of their own affairs.").
103. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (citing ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT
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tion of good faith, may engage in self-dealing if he discloses fully
any potential conflict of interest. 1 " The standard imposed upon
the for-profit corporate director is not a stringent one, probably
because of the realization ' 5 that most corporate directors have a

broad range of responsibility that no person could be expected
to discharge with perfection.
A trustee, on the other hand, is held, in the true trust, to a
very high standard of conduct. He is a fiduciary who must deal
with the property given him with the utmost loyalty and
fidelity. 10 6 He is responsible for loss resulting from mere negli10 7
gence and may not delegate the performance of his duties.
Further, any self-dealing will be subject to the closest
108
scrutiny.
The responsibilities of corporate directors appear to be
less than those of trustees in at least three respects: The directors are held to less strict standards of care. They are responsible only for losses proximately caused by their default. If the
default has been the commission of an ultra vires act, they are
liable, not absolutely, but only to the extent they failed to exercise due care in discovering the propriety of their action. Al-

ANN. 2d § 42 (1971)).
104. See Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 193 F.2d 666, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
The responsibilities of a director are:
a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. The duty of care imposes on the directors
the obligation to act in their corporate capacity in good faith and with the
degree of diligence, care, and skill which ordinary prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances. The duty of loyalty imposed on directors, somewhat more complex, requires them to act solely in the interests of the corporation and to forego conflicts of interest.
Berry & Buchwald, supra note 64, at 14 (citing W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS IN CORPORATIONS 50-69, 550, 513 (4th ed. 1969)). These duties are owed to the shareholders as
well as to the corporation. See also Wheeler, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Trustees in
Relation to the Financing of Private Institutions of Higher Education, 2 J.C. & U.L.
210 (1974).
105. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). "The trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform." Id.
108. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974) ("In conflict situations a trustee is guilty
of breach of trust for mere negligence involving self-dealing while a director must show
only 'entire fairness' and 'full disclosure.' ").
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though in the case of the charity formed as the result of the
incorporation of existing trustees, the trust standard has been
said to govern director conduct, it would seem that in other
cases ordinary corporation rules should apply.1" 9
College trustees are frequently involved, on a day-to-day
basis, in a business or other pursuit that provides an expertise
that is of particular value to the college. This source of expertise
-for example, working as an investment banker or raising funds
for other organizations-makes it impractical to require that a
college trustee comply with a strict trustee standard of performance. Not only does the other employment raise a potential conflict of interest, but the board must delegate day-to-day duties
of running the college to others.
Yet, a trustee without expertise, even though performing in
accordance with the strictest of trustee standards, is not likely to
benefit the college as much as the one with experience who performs at the corporate standard. Thus, the trustees of a college
are rarely required to perform according to trust standards of
care. 110 As stated by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia:
[T]he modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust
principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations, because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from those of their "pure" corporate counterparts.
...Since the board members of most large charitable corporations fall within the corporate rather than the trust model,
being charged with the operation of ongoing businesses, it has
been said that they should only be held to the less stringent
corporate standard of care."'
Judge Gesell attempted to establish a standard for directors

of charitable corporations acknowledging that the trustees are
often unpaid volunteers who do not spend significant amounts of

109. Note, The CharitableCorporation,64 HARV. L. REv. 1168, 1174 (1951) (citing
Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 562, 177 N.E. 557, 562 (1931)).
110. See Berry & Buchwald, supra note 64, at 14 (university trustees appear to be
held generally to the standard of a corporate director).
111. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (citing Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1948)).
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time on the affairs of the corporation." 2 The court found that a
trustee is in default of his fiduciary duty if he
fail[s] t6 use due diligence in supervising the actions [of delegates]...;
.. . knowingly permit[s] [the corporation] to enter into a
business transaction with himself or with any corporation,
partnership or association in which he then [has], a substantial
interest or [holds] a position as trustee, director, general manager or principal officer without... previously inform[ing] the
persons charged with approving that transaction of his interest
or position and of any significant reasons, unknown to or not
fully appreciated by such persons, why the transaction might
not be in the best interest of [the charity];
...

actively participate[s] in or vote[s] in favor of a de-

cision [involving himself]; or
.. . fails to perform his duties honestly, in good faith, and

13
with a reasonable amount of diligence and care.1

This standard is slightly higher than the ordinary care required
of the corporate director and might be labeled as the "charitable
corporate trustee" standard. Note that it is still a lower standard
11 4
than that applied to the trustee of an express trust, however.

112. See Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).
113. Id. at 1015.
114. The trustees' duty as codified in California, for example, is to
exercise the judgment and care, under the circumstances then prevailing,
which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management
of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the
probable safety of their capital ....
CAL. CrvL CODE § 2261 (West 1954), quoted in Lynch v. John M. Redfield Foundation, 9
Cal. App. 3d 293, 299-300, 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1970). In Lynch, the court added that the
statute requires the use of diligence to make the trust productive, that the obligation is
the same regardless of whether the trustee is compensated for his services, that good
faith is no defense, and that any liability for negligence is joint and several. Lynch v.
John M. Redfield Foundation, 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 301-03, 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91-92 (1970).
This case arose from disagreement among the trustees on policy matters with a resulting
inability to act that permitted substantial cash accumulations in noninterest-bearing
bank accounts over a period of five years.
Note that if there is an express trust, the obligation of the trustees is the same as
the obligation of the trustees of a private trust even if the charity is public. See Murphey
v. Dalton, 314 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1958).
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STRUCTURING A LEGAL ANALYSIS-A SECOND LOOK AT
WILSON COLLEGE

A.

The Wilson College Case

Zehner v. Alexander,115 the Wilson College case decided by
the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, is a recent example
of how one court handled a challenge to an attempted closing of

a college by its board of trustees. The case has not, and will not,
be reviewed by a higher court; thus, its value as a legal precedent is limited.11 Nevertheless, it provides a not atypical example of the reasoning courts use in addressing these challenges
and is useful as a framework for suggesting improvements in the
legal analysis.
1. The Facts.-Shortly after the planned closing of Wilson
College was announced, a petition was brought naming the
trustees as respondents and seeking, among other relief, an order
enjoining the closing of the school.117 Petitioners included a
member of the board of trustees who had not participated in the
decision to close the college, a student member of each class of
the college, one student who had paid a deposit to reserve a
place in the class matriculating in the fall of 1979, a member of
the faculty, and several alumnae. The alumnae had contributed
financially to the college.118 The college subsequently was joined
by order of the court as a necessary party."1 In addition to the
named petitioners, a member of the state attorney general's staff
participated in the proceedings as a representative of the public
115. 3 Franklin County Legal J. 27 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1979).
116. Subsequent to the May 25, 1979, order of the court, the parties agreed that in
exchange for the college paying the costs of the suit not covered by insurance, the trustees would not appeal the decision and would resign in favor of a group of trustees committed to keeping the college open.
The adjudication and Decree Nisi were filed on a Friday, and during that
weekend counsel for the respective parties met with the parties and on the
following Sunday presented to the Court a stipulation for a final Decree, which
essentially accepted the Conclusions of Law and Decree Nisi with the exception of permitting the College to assume a limited responsibility as to costs not
covered by the Trustees' liability insurance policy.
Letter from Judge John W. Keller to Miss Judy Reigel (August 20, 1979).
117. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 28.
118. One alumna previously had served as a trustee of the college and one currently
was serving as a trustee of a group formed to save the college after the announcement of
closing was made. Id. at 33.
119. Id. at 28.
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In reviewing the financial position of the college, the court
found that in 1974 the trustees had commissioned an extensive
study of Wilson College to explore the mechanisms that would
best assure the survival of the college.' 2 1 A severe decline in enrollment at the college had triggered the decision to obtain this
outside evaluation. 122 The consultants' report was an in-depth
analysis of the present and future status of the college, together
with a series of recommendations of how to continue as a viable
institution. The board of trustees had adopted some of these
recommendations at a regular meeting in the form of resolutions
for specific action. 123 The court
found, however, that these reso24
lutions were not carried out.
In the years between the 1974 report and 1979, a pattern of
declining enrollment continued 25 and endowment funds were
invaded to pay the annual operating deficit of the college. 12 The
board was told during the 1978-79 year that the class enrolling
in the fall of 1979 would be larger than the class that had entered in the fall of 1978.27 In the spring of 1979, however, the

board was informed that the class would be substantially smaller
than anticipated, about the same size as the class that had entered in 1978.128 A "hastily assembled" second panel of experts
was then consulted by the president and several members of the
board to determine whether or not there was anything the col-

120. Id.
121. Id. at 51.
122. Id. at 50.
123. Id. at 58.
124. Id.
125. The entering classes in the four years preceding the decision were:
1975
92 students
1976
36 students
1977
62 students
1978
55 students
Id. at 62.
126. The operating budget (deficits)/surpluses were:

1974-75
1975-76
1976-77

($862,546)
($442,888)
$7,327

1977-78

$31,449

Id. at 61. The deficits were paid from unrestricted endowment. Id. at 62.
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id.
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lege could do to persevere in the face of this critical factor. The
court found this second panel to be an inappropriate resource
because none of its members were experienced with small colleges.12 In concurrence with the recommendation of the second
panel, the board publicly announced its decision to close the college. Attempts were commenced to relocate students and faculty
in furtherance of the decision to close. Prior to this announcement, the board did not obtain amendment to the articles of
incorporation to permit creation of a foundation nor did they
institute cy pres proceedings, 130 even though they had contemplated both of these actions in the resolution of closing.131
2. The Court's Legal Analysis.-The court disposed of the
standing issue by concluding without discussion that all petitioners except the students had standing to sue. 132 It then

129. We do not question the good intentions or the good motives of the panel
of experts. However, comparing their 6 hour meeting to the meticulous preliminary preparations, on campus investigations and interviews, team meetings,
preliminary and final reports of the Moon Report consultants and the Middle
Atlantic Association evaluators; we find their oral report as presented utterly
devoid of merit or value.
Id, at 68.
130. Id. at 35.
131. See id. at 69-70. The resolution of closing stated:
It is agreed by the Board that as of 1 July 1979 the corporate entity in
which Wilson College now conducts its function shall change its corporate
name to the Wilson College Foundation, and that the assets of the foundation
other than those needed for the administrative functioning of the foundation
that are not already in such form shall then be converted, over such period of
time as to the foundation shall seem necessary and prudent with a view to
maximizing values, into endowment or investment-type assets producing an
appropriate return.
The purpose of the Wilson College Foundation shall thenceforth be to

continue to work toward the aims of Wilson College when an operating educational institution, and to administer the assets of the foundation in a manner
as nearly as possible to fulfill the purposes fulfilled by Wilson College when an
operating educational institution. The purpose of Wilson College as stated by
its founders and continued to the present time has been to provide for women
the opportunity for a broad and thorough education of the highest quality..... Hence the purpose of the Wilson College Foundation shall be to foster
the liberal education of women for excellence, for leadership, for service.
Id. at 70-71.
132. Id. at 84. The trustee-plaintiff had statutory standing to ask for the removal of
a fellow trustee. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7726(c) (Purdon 1976). Beyond that, it is
not clear why any of the remaining parties, other than the attorney general, who joined
after the proceeding commenced, were allowed to proceed. See notes 61-100 and accompanying text supra.
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focused the bulk of its legal analysis upon a jurisdictional
question.
Since the college is a not-for-profit corporation, it was found
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Orphan's Court under
Rule 2156 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration.13 3 This jurisdiction extends to all internal matters of the
corporation including removal of trustees, validity of corporate
action, and supervision of the purposes for which the funds of
the corporation are used.13 4 In addition, the court held that it
had jurisdiction under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries
Code, 3 5 which requires prior approval of the court before property can be diverted from the charitable purpose for which it
was given.

13 6

The purpose for which Wilson College held assets was found
to be the operation of an educational institution although the
articles of incorporation recite a more general purpose: "The object and purpose of said corporation are hereby declared to be to
promote the education of young women in literature, science and

133. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 80. Rule 2156 provides that the orphans' court
division of the court of common pleas shall have jurisdiction of: "(1) Nonprofit corporations: The administration and proper application of property committed to charitable
purposes held or controlled by any domestic or foreign nonprofit corporation ... " Id.
at 80 (quoting PA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2156).
134. See 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 80. For this proposition the court cites In re
Pennsylvania Home Teaching Soc'y, 15 Pa. Fiduc. 556 (1975) (concerning a cy pres
award of assets of one nonprofit corporation to another, but not concerning any management of the corporation by the court); The Music Fund Soc'y, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 115
(1975) (concerning the role of the attorney general in a beneficiaries' suit for accounting,
although the court noted that its jurisdiction extended to internal matters); Women's
Christian Temperance Union v. Bearhalter, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 207 (1977) (holding that the
court had jurisdiction over internal matters of a nonprofit corporation even when the
issues were not related to property of the corporation). 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 80.
The decision examined in these cases was the trustee's decision to implement an alternative use of charitable funds, not the management of those funds. Bearhalterconcerned
setting aside a deed improperly given, not an alternative use.
135. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 81 (citing 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 711 (Purdon

1976)).
( 136. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 81 (quoting 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7549(b)
(Purdon 1976), as follows: "Property committed to charitable purposes shall not, by any
proceeding under Chapter 79 of this title (relating to fundamental changes) or otherwise,
be diverted from the objects to which it was donated, granted or devised, unless and
until the board of directors or other body obtains from the court an order under the
Estates Act of 1947 specifying the disposition of the property." (emphasis added by the
court).
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the arts. 13 7 The court did not set out what evidence it considered persuasive to conclude that operating a college was the fundamental purpose of the corporation. Nevertheless, having concluded that the board's decision to close the college was a
decision to divert the assets from the purpose of the corporation,
the court reasoned that the effect of allowing the trustees to go
forward without prior court approval would be to divest the
court of its jurisdiction granted by the statute. It followed that
the attorney general, as the representative of the public, would
also be divested of an opportunity to "comment upon or protest
the decision. ' 138 Therefore, acts in furtherance of the decision to
close were found to be contra to the probate jurisdictional grant
and for that reason were enjoined. It is not clear whether the
court concluded that the board's action also violated the court's
jurisdictional grant under Rule 2156 to supervise the purpose for
which funds were used.
The only legal issue actually determined was one of jurisdiction. The conclusions and order of the court, however, go further. The order not only enjoined the closing of the college because the board's implementation of its decision to close was
held to be illegal, but also removed two members of the board
and assessed costs to the defendants.13 9 In the second section of

137. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 29 (quoting 1869 Pa. Laws 504, No. 481, the Act
incorporating Wilson Female College).
138. The court stated:
By implementing the decision to close Wilson College the Trustees attempted to essentially deprive the Court of its power to review the recommendation of the Board and to approve or disapprove the proposed diversion of
college assets from a teaching institution to some other charitable use. In addition, the implementation of the decision to close Wilson College without prior
approval of the Court attempted to deprive the public, represented by the
Attorney General as parens patriae, of an opportunity to comment upon or
protest the decision.
Id. at 82.
139. Id. at 86. The decision to remove two trustees on petition of another trustee
was proper both in terms of the court's authority and application of the appropriate
standard. "[T]he court may, upon petition of any member or director, remove from office
any director in case of fraudulent or dishonest acts, or gross abuse of authority or discretion with reference to the corporation, or for any other proper cause." 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7126(c) (Purdon 1976). One petitioner was a trustee as required by the statute
and the court found "gross abuse of discretion" and "other cause" as the bases for removal. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 83. Although one could disagree with the conclusion that the statutory standards for removal had been met based on the facts produced
at the hearing, the legal standard applied by the court was the proper one as mandated
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the opinion, headed "conclusions of law" but not included in the
"Decree Nisi," was a directive to the remaining trustees to fill
the vacancies on the board "and take the action necessary to
insure that Wilson College will open to discharge its chartered
purposes at the appropriate time in September, 1979 ....
The court further required that "[t]he Board of Trustees shall
'
meet as often as the exigencies of the situation shall require." 4
The conclusions of law also included a determination that the
Board of Trustees had a fiduciary duty to the college that required the "Board to use those assets of the College to continue
it as an institution of higher learning and as a teaching institution until its charter purposes became impossible or impractical
of fulfillment."142 The court found that as of the February 17
board meeting, when the decision to close was made, as well as
at the time of the court's decision, it may have been true that
things were difficult for the college, but not "impossible or
' 4
impractical.

1

B. Restructuring the Legal Analysis
The decision of the Wilson College trustees had been to
continue the charitable corporation under another name and to
have it function solely as a revenue producing fund. 144 The in-

come from the fund was to be used to continue the purpose of
educating women through scholarships and contributions to women's colleges. The board could have opted instead to dissolve
the corporation and been within the express grant of authority
of the not-for-profit corporation code. After dissolution, distribution of the remaining assets would have required a cy pres

proceeding if the articles of incorporation made no provision for
the distribution upon dissolution.1 45 The court did not allude to
by the statute.
140. 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 86.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 85.
143. Id. ,
144. This mechanism could be characterized as resulting in a fundamental change in
the purpose of the corporation or a change in the mode of accomplishing the fundamental purpose of the corporation. The Wilson Board of Trustees clearly believed it was
choosing the latter approach, as expressed in the resolution of closing. See note 131
supra.
145. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 399, Comment o (1957).
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whether a decision to dissolve would have been treated in the
same way as the decision to continue the same corporation. It is
probable, however, that the
ultimate conclusion of the court
146
would have been the same.

Whether the mechanism used is retention of the same corporation or its dissolution, if the purpose to which the assets will
be put is fundamentally different, the court must approve of the
alternative use prior to its implementation. What the court in
the Wilson College case apparently did not recognize was that
the statute147 requiring court approval of alternative use does
not require prior approval of the decision to change. Thus, the
court's review of the decision that continued operation of the
college was financially impracticable should have been limited to
whether the decision was made in good faith and with due care.
If the answer to this inquiry had been affirmative then the continuation of the college would have been in issue no longer. The
issue remaining for judicial determination would be simply the
use to which the assets would be put, a determination that could
be made prior to implementation of the decision. The court's
failure to recognize the precise legal issues muddied the clarity
of its analysis.
There should have been three separate inquiries: (1) was the
board's decision to close the college because of financial impracticability made in compliance with the appropriate standard of
due care and in good faith; (2) was the board's decision that an
educational foundation is a change of fundamental purpose
made with due care and in good faith; and (3) to what use shall
the remaining assets be put?
Rather than separating the questions, the court determined
that the closing itself was a fundamental change of purpose,
which, if carried out, would divest the court of its jurisdiction to
determine whether the impracticability of continuation was

146. Arguably, dissolution is a power expressly given to the board by statute and
any apparent conflict between this power and the jurisdictional statute should be construed away if possible. Both could be given effect by limiting the scope of jurisdiction to
a review of the process by which the board exercised the power to dissolve. In this particular case it is unlikely that a decision to dissolve would have been treated differently
because the court expressly found that the board had the power to decide to close the
college, but that the exercise of the power worked a divestment of jurisdiction.
147. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7549(b) (Purdon 1976). For relevant text of the
statute, see note 136 supra.
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properly determined.1 4 8 This conclusion was reached although
the court was at the time actively exercising its jurisdiction to
answer that very question.

Ordinarily, the power to review a decision is not the power
to substitute the judgment of the court for that of the decisionmaker. The court's review usually is limited to whether the
decisionmaker properly discharged the duties imposed upon him
by law. The difficulty surrounding review of a decision to close a
college is that the finding of financial viability is relevant to two
different inquiries. It is a business decision properly within the
province of the board and it is a factual finding properly within
the province of the court in a cy pres proceeding. To permit the
board alone to make the determination precludes the court and
vice versa. How is the cycle broken to permit both parties a
proper domain? Perhaps the answer is for the court to question
first whether the financial impracticability of the present mode
as found by the board is a properly made business decision. If
yes, then, second, is the fundamental purpose of the corporation
as determined by the board a properly made business decision?
By this analysis, the court still makes its own required findings
of fact, but is limited to reviewing the board's decision, rather
than making a de novo determination.
Using this analysis, the court might have reached the same
conclusion, without substituting its judgment for that of the
board, in the Wilson College case. The court found that the
trustees violated their fiduciary duty to the college when they
decided to close. 149 The finding of breach is supported in the record by a finding that the board acted without adequate information. Certainly premature decision-making based on less than
full facts is insufficient to qualify as fulfillment of a duty of due
care and good faith. 50 Although one might disagree with the
finding of fact, it dictates the conclusion that the decision does
not meet the requirements of any standard of care that might be
15 1
appropriate.

148. See notes 134-43 and accompanying text supra.
149. See 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 85.

150. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974).
151. When using the label "fiduciary" it is unclear whether the court meant to apply
a trustee or corporate standard of care, but in view of the lack of information, it does not

matter, since the result would have been the same. To the extent that the decision is
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If the trustees did breach their obligation to the college, the
decision to close was improper. Upon this finding, the court
might have required that the corporation continue as before.
Significantly, though, the court would not have used its power to
review as a means of substituting its judgment for that of the
trustees. The finding would simply have been that the board's
decision could not stand because it was not made -with reasonable care. The implication of this approach is that if the decision
were made again in compliance with appropriate legal standards,
it would be upheld.
This analysis would have recognized that the actual judgment regarding the financial status of the corporation is one for
the board and not for the court. Thus, appropriately limited, the
decision would have left intact the authority of the board to
make financial determinations while continuing to give the court
the power to approve the alternative use of the assets once the
board's determination was made. Protection of the legitimate
donor interest in having the assets continue to be used to
achieve the fundamental purpose of the Wilson College Corporation would have been assured and the public's interest in the
benefits would have been maintained.
III.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN IDEAL WORLD

A.

Standing

When the decision to be tested legally is the decision by the
board that the continued operation of the college is financially
impracticable, the most appropriate standard for determining
standing to sue is one approximating the injury-in-fact standard
that has been developed in the federal courts. 152 To continue to
restrict standing to the attorney general as the exclusive repre-

sentative of the beneficial interest is unrealistic when there are
groups of people such as students and faculty who have a present interest in the effect of the decision that is both immediate
and more than speculative in scope. These persons can be readily identified and are likely to provide active representation.
This is not to say that all decisions of the board should be
persuasive in other cases, however, arguably the standard chosen by the court was the
trustee standard which is out of step with the trend in other jurisdictions.
152. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See note 99 supra.
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subject to suit by an expanded class of plaintiffs. This particular
type of decision is distinguishable from others, in that by its nature it is not subject to effective reversal once it is carried out.
Further, allowance of a large number of plaintiffs is not likely to
promote nuisance suits that drain the assets of the charitable
corporation or bring its beneficial activities to a halt.1 5 3 One suit
can decide whether or not the decision that continuing to operate is financially impracticable has been properly made. Assuming that the decision is found to be proper, that same suit could
then decide whether the proposed alternative use of the assets of
the corporation requires application of the cy pres doctrine 54 or
whether it is simply a matter of change of mode. Nor is it a situation in which the actual interest of the expanded plaintiff
group is minimal.
In short, the rationale of cases finding that the standing of
the attorney general is exclusive does not support continuing
that rule in a case such as the Wilson College case. It is no answer that a member of the board may bring the action if the
attorney general will not, because it is entirely possible that no
member of the board will be in disagreement with the decision.
Nor is it helpful to rely on the consent of the attorney general to
an "ex rel" proceeding, because speed and certainty are
important.
The goal of requiring a board to act in a responsible manner
while permitting it to get on with the business of legitimately
closing a college will not be served by litigation over appropriate
standing. With enough time and ingenuity, the bar will find a
way to place the issue of the board's decision-making before a
court. Because time is important in resolving the issue in a manner that does not waste assets, artificial road blocks to an actual
resolution simply are not helpful.
A move by state courts to expand their traditionally liberal
approach 5 5 when dealing with this limited problem would be

153. See Davis, supra note 93.
154. It is the fundamental-change question in which the public has its primary interest; therefore, it would be appropriate to join the attorney general as a party to the
proceeding once this issue arises if the court feels it necessary or desirable. Presumably,
the immediate beneficiaries, who are the plaintiffs, will also protect the public interest in
having the original purpose carried out whether or not the attorney general is joined.
155. It is ironic that states traditionally have not thwarted access to the courts by
using doctrines of standing, but have been liberal in their approach. Yet when charities
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consistent with the policies of the exclusive standing requirement, while recognizing that the primary objective is to make a
rapid determination of the propriety of the board's decision to
close.
B.

The Standard for Trustee Performance

The standard of care with which a college board of trustees
must make decisions concerning financial impracticability and
purpose remains a second unresolved legal problem.1 56 The two
standards most frequently used to describe the choice available
to the courts are the reasonable man standard of the for-profit
corporation (the director standard)1 57 and the fiduciary standard
of the true trust (the trustee standard). 5 8 The favored approach1 59 appears to be that, absent an express trust, the director standard is applicable even though the duty may be described as "fiduciary."' 16 0 In its analysis the court should look at
the facts available to the decision-maker at the time of the decision and make a two-tiered inquiry: first, were the facts available
to the decision-maker adequate and, second, was the decision
made with due care?
In the case of the college trustee confronted with the possibility of closing the college, the duty to exercise due care should
include an affirmative obligation to find out the precise and actual financial condition of the college, both past and projected as

are involved, they have permitted this rule to operate in a restrictive manner. The rationale has been that the restrictions operate to protect the public good.
156. The discussion here is restricted to private colleges because presumably the
decision of a legislature to close a particular college in the public sector is a statement of
its decision that the public interest is no longer served by continuation of the college.
Because the legislature can define the public interest, it should not be subject to the
same controls as the decision of the trustees of the private college. Also, it is probably
fair to presume that any private endowment funds transferred from the closed public
college to another purpose by the legislature will be transferred with appropriate protection of the public interest in mind. Where the "private funds" are in the hands of a
separate corporation or foundation established to support the public college that is being
closed, that foundation is then faced with making a determination about its fundamental
purpose and whether or not it can continue to be met.
157. See notes 101-04 and accompanying text supra.
158. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
159. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
160. "Fiduciary" means in a relationship of trust or influence. It is frequently in this
sense that the term fiduciary is used by the courts to include a director or a trustee when
discussing the appropriate standard of conduct.
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well as present; an affirmative obligation to understand the information acquired; and an affirmative obligation to evaluate
that information thoroughly, together with its implications for
the continued existence to the college. Once this duty is met, the
decision of the trustees should be upheld by the courts.181
C. A Determinationof Purpose
Whether the closing of a college is in fact a fundamental
change of purpose or simply a change of mode is also a threshhold question that courts must consider. The distinctions are
significant. While a fundamental change of purpose requires
court approval of the alternative use whether or not suit is
brought by third parties, a change in mode may not require any
prior court approval. 1 62 A broad interpretation of purpose gives
greater weight to the public interest in having charitable assets
maximized, while a narrow interpretation gives greater weight to
the presumed intention of the donor. Either is certainly a rational approach. Because both of these interpretations are rational, when a jurisdiction does not mandate a particular choice,
then the choice is an exercise of discretion that should be left to
the trustees, not the court.
In a time when assets are scarce, it seems something less
than appropriate for the court to tell trustees who reasonably
choose to use salvagable resources in an alternative mode of delivery, rather than applying them in what is perceived as a failing and inefficient enterprise, that they have misconceived their

161. When the decision is to close rather than to continue, it is particularly important that the trustees be assured that a court will support the decision and permit the
closing to occur in an orderly manner that will most efficiently preserve the assets available for alternative use. If lengthy litigation will be involved, the objective of asset preservation will be impossible because the college will be required to "pour good money
after bad" pending a decision. Obviously, if the college is allowed to close pending a
decision, the option of re-opening is remote at best. Therefore, to preserve the status quo
and the option of continuing if the decision is found to be improper, it will be necessary
to suspend the act of closing during the pendency of litigation.
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1957). The issue is frequently
confusing because the mode of delivery may be the fundamental purpose. For example,
when the purpose is to create a free hospital, the hospital's existence is the objective as
well as the mode of delivering medical care. If the purpose is to provide medical care and
the method chosen is to create a free hospital, then the hospital is only the mode and not
the purpose. That same objective, medical care, could be met by paying medical bills
incurred at other hospitals or by operating a system of visiting nurses.
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purpose. 63 This is particularly true when the language of the
articles of incorporation, as in the Wilson College case, includes
the purpose viewed as proper by the trustees as well as that ultimately determined to be right by the court. Certainty will be
enhanced if the trustees can have confidence that their decision
will be honored and that, therefore, it is not necessary to seek
declaratory relief before acting, or to refrain from acting on the
theory that continuing until impossibility is clear will moot any
question about whether the time for action has arrived.
D. Conclusion
To require that a college waste its remaining assets when it
is no longer a financially viable corporation is not in the public
interest. To require that trustees litigate their decision for several years does not facilitate maximization of resources of either
the college or the bench and bar. To permit trustees that act
reasonably to act with certainty is the only viable alternative.
Though as alums we may love our colleges and certainly do
not want to "pull the plug" prematurely, to require the college
to die a slow and public death is not desirable. As the hospice
movement has demonstrated in the biological world, when death
is inevitable, death with dignity should be available. So, when
the financial viability of a quality college has ended, the trustees
should be permitted to close the college in a clean, orderly manner. No one knows the college better, nor cares about the college
more. The law should be clear that the trustees' reasonable judgments will not be second-guessed, nor will they be deprived of
quick adjudication of appropriate issues by a judiciary manning
the barricades with worn-out doctrines of standing.

163. It must be remembered that the board, in determining the future of the college
or university, must take into account a number of factors, other than mere survival, that
courts rarely mention. The relevant considerations may include whether a change in curriculum from the pure liberal arts to include more "vocational" courses in an effort to
increase enrollment would be viewed by those concerned as a change worse than closing,
whether the maintenance of a predominantly teaching or a more research-oriented
faculty is financially more sound; whether a change in the population of the school to
include older students or nonresidents is a change of mission; or whether the geographic
location of the college is a crucial consideration in the mind of the donor. The decision,
therefore, of whether mere survival is enough should belong to the board without the
prospect of being second-guessed by the courts.
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